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Justice Scalia’s Hat Trick and the
Supreme Court’s Flawed
Understanding of Twenty-First
Century Arbitration
Jill I. Gross†
INTRODUCTION
I have long been a fan of arbitration and have defended
most forms of it as fair,1 bucking the trend of many legal scholars
who have criticized the process, particularly that resulting from
mandatory2 or “forced” arbitration.3 For many disputants,

† James D. Hopkins Professor of Law, Pace Law School. I am grateful for the
valuable feedback I received from discussants in the SEALS 2014 program, Mandatory
Arbitration and the Question of Justice, and for the opportunity Pace Law School gave
me to present these ideas at the school’s James D. Hopkins Memorial Lecture on
November 12, 2014. I also am grateful for the insights of Barbara Black and Don
Doernberg, as well as the thorough research assistance of Pace Law students Rana
Abihabib, C.J. Croll, and Olivia Darius.
1 See, e.g., Jill I. Gross, The End of Mandatory Securities Arbitration?, 30
PACE L. REV. 1174 (2010) (defending securities arbitration as a fair process); Jill I.
Gross & Barbara Black, When Perception Changes Reality: An Empirical Study of
Investors’ Views of the Fairness of Securities Arbitration, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL. 349
(2008) (theorizing explanations for customers’ negative perceptions of the fairness of
securities arbitration); Jill I. Gross, McMahon Turns Twenty: The Regulation of
Fairness in Securities Arbitration, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 493 (2008) [hereinafter Gross,
McMahon Turns Twenty] (concluding that securities arbitration is a fair process). But
see Jill I. Gross, AT&T Mobility and the Future of Small Claims Arbitration, 42 SW. U.
L. REV. 47 (2012) [hereinafter Gross, Small Claims Arbitration] (critiquing “paper”
arbitration of low-dollar-value claims as unfair).
2 “Mandatory” arbitration in this context means arbitration resulting from a
predispute arbitration clause in an adhesive agreement between parties of unequal
bargaining power.
3 See, e.g., Mark E. Budnitz, The High Cost of Mandatory Consumer Arbitration,
67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 133 (2004) (arguing that arbitration is “unavailable to many
consumers because its cost is too great”); Alexander J.S. Colvin, Mandatory Arbitration and
Inequality of Justice in Employment, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 71, 90 (2014) (“[R]ather
than enhancing equality, mandatory arbitration exacerbates inequality in access to justice
in the workplace.”); Jean R. Sternlight, Disarming Employees: How American Employers are
Using Mandatory Arbitration to Deprive Workers of Legal Protection, 80 BROOK. L. REV.
1309 (2015) (critiquing employers’ use of mandatory arbitration to decrease employees’
access to justice); Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Arbitration Fairness Index: Using a Public
Rating System to Skirt the Legal Logjam and Promote Fairer and More Effective Arbitration
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arbitration provides a cost-efficient, prompt, private, and final
mechanism to resolve disputes. In most forums, panels of
unbiased arbitrators provide parties with a full and fair hearing,
as an award risks vacatur if the panel deprives parties of the
opportunity to present relevant evidence.4
The existence of arbitration as a viable dispute resolution
process empowers disputants by providing them with a binding
alternative to traditional litigation. Indeed, the availability of
varied dispute resolution processes allows parties to tailor the
decisionmaking mechanism to their particular dispute. “Process
pluralism,” an ideology that rejects legal centrism (the notion that
courts, law, and lawyers are the primary means of handling
disputes) and favors a multiplicity of dispute mechanisms,5
promotes utilizing the most appropriate dispute resolution process
to enhance the delivery of substantive and procedural justice.6
No doubt arbitration is an increasingly important dispute
resolution mechanism in the United States, fueled in part by the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence interpreting section 2 of the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)7—which declares the validity,
of Employment and Consumer Disputes, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 985, 988-91 (2012) (identifying
fairness concerns surrounding the growth of mandatory arbitration clauses).
4 See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3) (2012) (authorizing courts to vacate an award upon
proof that “the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to . . . hear evidence
pertinent and material to the controversy”); see also Gross, McMahon Turns Twenty,
supra note 1, at 506 (“[T]oday’s FAA jurisprudence makes it incontrovertible that an
arbitration hearing arising under the FAA must include the classic hallmarks of
fairness: notice, a right to be heard, and a neutral decision-maker.”).
5 See John Lande, Getting the Faith: Why Business Lawyers and Executives
Believe in Mediation, 5 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 137, 147, 149 (2000) (“A key element of
process pluralism is the belief in the legitimacy of a multiplicity of disputing mechanisms.”);
see also Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Mediation: The “New Arbitration,” 17 HARV. NEGOT. L.
REV. 61, 92 (2012) (theorizing that mediation’s move towards an arbitration model is an
example of process pluralism); Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, Mapping Mediation:
The Risks of Riskin’s Grid, 3 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 71, 89 (1998) (“Maintaining the integrity
of the alternatives to adjudication ensures ‘process pluralism’ in our dispute resolution
system.”). Some disagreement persists about the origins of the term “process pluralism.” See
Kovach & Love, supra, at 89 n.100.
6 See Jean R. Sternlight, Is Binding Arbitration a Form of ADR?: An
Argument That the Term “ADR” Has Begun to Outlive Its Usefulness, 2000 J. DISP.
RESOL. 97, 107 (2000) (describing the evolution of the theory of “appropriate” rather
than just “alternative” dispute resolution and defining it as an “array” of dispute
resolution mechanisms that “are complementary to one another in the sense that they
each have their own strengths and weaknesses and are therefore appropriate in some
situations, and inappropriate in others”).
7 FAA § 2 provides:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to
perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit
to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract,
transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
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irrevocability, and enforceability of arbitration agreements—to
reflect “an emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute
resolution”8 (the process) and a “liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration agreements” (the contract to use the process).9 Thus,
the Court’s decisions depend on both characterizing arbitration
as a favored dispute resolution process and rigorously enforcing
arbitration agreements against virtually any challenge.
While in recent years the Court has bolstered the
arbitrability of claims and sharply curtailed most defenses to
the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate disputes,10 I had
held out hope that a safety valve existed. Specifically, I hoped
that the federal-law-based “vindicating rights” doctrine would
provide some relief to parties who found themselves bound to
an unfair arbitration clause, particularly in contracts of
adhesion. That doctrine permits a party to challenge the
enforceability of an arbitration agreement with proof that the
arbitration clause prevented it from vindicating its federal
statutory rights in arbitration.11
My hopes were dashed in the spring of 2013 when the
Court decided American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant.12
The third in a series of recent FAA opinions authored by Justice
Scalia,13 the Court in Italian Colors ruled that—to the extent it
exists at all—the vindicating rights doctrine precludes the
enforcement of an arbitration clause only when a party can show
that the clause deprived it of the right to prove its federal
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) The final phrase of this section is called the FAA’s “savings clause,”
as it preserves common law contract defenses to challenge arbitration agreements.
8 Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1203 (2012)
(quoting KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, 132 S. Ct. 23, 25 (2011) (per curiam) (internal quotation
marks omitted)); see also Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (declaring
that the FAA reflects a “national policy favoring arbitration”).
9 Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
10 See, e.g., Marmet, 132 S. Ct. at 1203 (preempting West Virginia law barring
enforcement of a predispute arbitration clause in a nursing home agreement in a
negligence suit); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (preempting
California law declaring unconscionable consumer arbitration agreements with class
action waivers).
11 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 659 (1985) (recognizing in dicta that a court could refuse to enforce an arbitration
agreement on public policy grounds if a party shows that it cannot vindicate its federal
statutory rights in the arbitration forum); see also Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v.
Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 92 (2000) (recognizing in dicta that, if a party showed that
pursuing its statutory claims through arbitration would be prohibitively expensive, and
thus it could not vindicate its statutory rights, a court could validly refuse to enforce a
predispute arbitration agreement); Hiro N. Aragaki, The Federal Arbitration Act as
Procedural Reform, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1939, 2018 (2014) (describing the vindicating
rights doctrine as an “equitable safety valve”).
12 Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
13 The first two are AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. 1740, and CompuCredit Corp.
v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012).
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statutory claims in arbitration (as opposed to the ability to prove
those claims).14 An arbitration clause waiving a party’s right to
pursue a claim on an aggregated basis did not remove the party’s
right to bring a claim, just the method of bringing it. Thus, the
vindicating rights doctrine did not void an arbitration agreement
with a class action waiver even though a party to that agreement
could not afford to bring a low-dollar-value claim individually in
arbitration (e.g., because expensive expert testimony was
necessary to prove elements of a federal antitrust claim). The
disputant simply could not pursue the claim at all.
Italian Colors discouraged many scholars who believed
that eliminating the ability of parties bound to mandatory
arbitration clauses to pursue class action claims stripped them of
some statutory rights.15 A closer look at the Italian Colors
decision, however, reveals what I believe to be a factual mistake
in Justice Scalia’s majority opinion.16 While I have no doubt that
this mistake17 had no bearing on the ultimate outcome of the case,
it triggered my thinking about what other mistakes18 the Court
might have made in its arbitration decisions.
In this article, I report on the results of my close
examination of more than two dozen opinions the Court has
handed down interpreting the FAA—arising primarily from
commercial, consumer, employment, or securities disputes—since
the beginning of the twenty-first century only fifteen years ago.19 I
Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2311.
See, e.g., David Garcia & Leo Caseria, Opinion Analysis: A Class Action Waiver
in an Arbitration Agreement Will be Strictly Enforced Under the Federal Arbitration Act,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 21, 2013, 10:45 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/opinionanalysis-a-class-action-waiver-in-an-arbitration-agreement-will-be-strictly-enforced-underthe-federal-arbitration-act/ [http://perma.cc/KD9A-G92D] (“The Court’s view of the effective
vindication exception is so narrow that it may not serve a useful purpose going forward.”);
Jean Sternlight, American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant Guts Enforcement of
Federal Laws, INDISPUTABLY (June 20, 2013), http://www.indisputably.org/?p=4750
[http://perma.cc/84D4-J44K].
16 This surely is not the only factual error made by a court. See Andrew D.
Hurwitz, When Judges Err: Is Confession Good For The Soul?, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 343, 344
(2014) (arguing that judges whose opinions contain factual or legal errors should
“freely acknowledge[] and transparently correct[] the occasional ‘goof’”); cf. Richard J.
Lazarus, The (Non)Finality of Supreme Court Opinions, 128 HARV. L. REV. 540 (2014)
(discussing the Supreme Court’s practice of revising its opinions to correct errors before
the opinions’ bound publication).
17 See infra Section III.A.3.
18 By “mistake,” I don’t mean legal interpretations with which I disagree. See,
e.g., Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How The Supreme Court Created a
Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99 (2006)
(arguing that the Court wrongly decided Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12
(1984)). Rather, I mean provably inaccurate factual statements.
19 BG Group PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198 (2014); Italian
Colors, 133 S. Ct. 2304; Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064 (2013); NitroLift Techs., L.L.C. v. Howard, 133 S. Ct. 500 (2012); Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v.
Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012); CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012);
14
15
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focus on cases in which the Court was asked to decide a question
of arbitrability—whether a claim is arbitrable or whether an
agreement to arbitrate is enforceable under FAA section 2. I have
concluded that these decisions are built on a narrative of an
arbitration process that no longer exists, although it may have
existed in the twentieth century when Congress passed the FAA.
The Court’s antiquated understanding of the process threatens to
undermine arbitration as a just alternative dispute resolution
(ADR) mechanism.
Part I of this article describes the process of arbitration,
the law that regulates the process, and how both law and process
have evolved from the twentieth to the twenty-first century. Part
II zeroes in on three opinions enforcing arbitration agreements
challenged by consumers seeking to bring statutory claims as
class actions. All three opinions were authored by Justice Scalia
in 2011, 2012, and 201320—what I call Scalia’s “Hat Trick.”21 As I
see it, Justice Scalia scored three times in the game of
arbitration—and corporate counsel were likely cheering on the
sidelines as their “goals” were achieved: to suppress consumers’
ability to bring individual class actions against companies based
on claims arising under federal statutes.22 Many arbitration
KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, 132 S. Ct. 23 (2011); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct.
1740 (2011); Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287 (2010); Rent-ACenter, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (2010); Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l
Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010); Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624 (2009); 14
Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247 (2009); Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49
(2009); Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008); Preston v. Ferrer, 552
U.S. 346 (2008); Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006); Green
Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003); Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S.
52 (2003); Pacificare Health Sys. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401 (2003); Howsam v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002); EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002);
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001); Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill
Harbert Constr. Co., 529 U.S. 193 (2000); Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531
U.S. 79 (2000). Though my selection of the year 2000 as a cutoff was largely based on its
simplicity, ironically enough, the first arbitration decision of the century was the one that
gave disputants hope that the vindicating rights doctrine provided the very safety valve
that now seems closed. See Green Tree Fin., 531 U.S. 79 (recognizing vindicating rights
doctrine in dicta).
20 See Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. 2304; CompuCredit Corp., 132 S. Ct. 665;
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740.
21 When a hockey player scores three goals in a single game, he has achieved
a “hat trick.” See Hat Trick, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed.
2003). Fans typically celebrate the third goal by throwing their hats onto the ice.
22 See Ross v. Am. Express Co., 35 F. Supp. 3d 407 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (detailing
concerted actions, including 28 group meetings of issuer banks across the credit card
industry, to include PDAAs in their customer agreements so as to suppress consumers’
ability to bring class action suits against the industry); see also Nancy A. Welsh &
Stephen J. Ware, Ross et al. v. American Express et al.: The Story Behind the Spread of
Class Action-Barring Arbitration Clauses in Credit Card Agreements, 21 DISP. RESOL.
MAG. 18 (2014) (detailing findings of the Ross court); cf. CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION
BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY PRELIMINARY RESULTS 58-60 (2013) (describing very low
number of claims filed by consumers across four industries). But see Peter B. Rutledge

116

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:1

scholars have sharply criticized those decisions as anti-consumer
or anti-employee, claim suppressing, and at odds with the
fundamental right to have a dispute heard in a courtroom.23
Part III argues that, in the Court’s twenty-first-century
arbitration cases, when justifying its holdings, the Court assumes
without factual basis that arbitration is a one-size-fits-all process
that is quick and inexpensive for all disputants who have
ultimate control over the procedures. This part demonstrates that
the Court’s oversimplified and out-of-touch decisions have crafted
a legal framework that regulates an arbitration process that
largely no longer exists.
The article concludes by arguing that the Court’s
expansion of the FAA improperly rests on an outmoded
understanding of the modern arbitration process and fails to
recognize the many varieties of arbitration that exist today. Those
decisions have led to concerns and criticisms that arbitration is no
longer a fair process and have promoted a flight from arbitration.
This flight necessarily decreases the range of ADR options that
parties have at their disposal and ultimately hurts the values of
process pluralism.
By setting the record straight, I hope to provide some
insights into challenges to the Court’s FAA decisions that may
still exist and that have the potential to lead to a reinvigoration of
many types of arbitration as appealing alternatives to litigation.
I.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF ARBITRATION

A.

Premodern History

Arbitration is a dispute resolution process in which parties
agree to submit their dispute to a third-party neutral who hears
from all parties and imposes a binding decision, or award, on the
disputants.24 Arbitration is based on the theory that parties agree
& Christopher R. Drahozal, “Sticky” Arbitration Clauses? The Use Of Arbitration
Clauses After Concepcion and Amex, 67 VAND. L. REV. 955 (2014) (finding no empirical
evidence that companies are inserting arbitration clauses coupled with class action
waivers since Concepcion).
23 See Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration Clauses Prevent
Consumers from Presenting Procedurally Difficult Claims, 42 SW. L. REV. 87 (2012); Jean
R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes Access to Justice, 90
OR. L. REV. 703 (2012) [hereinafter Sternlight, Tsunami]; David S. Schwartz, ClaimSuppressing Arbitration: The New Rules, 87 IND. L.J. 239, 240 (2012).
24 See IMRE STEPHEN SZALAI, OUTSOURCING JUSTICE: THE RISE OF MODERN
ARBITRATION LAWS IN AMERICA 7 (2013); see also Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Arbitration
Penumbra: Arbitration Law and the Rapidly Changing Landscape of Dispute Resolution, 8
NEV. L.J. 427, 435-36 (2007) (listing four elements of arbitration as “(a) a process to settle
disputes between parties; (b) a neutral third party; (c) an opportunity for the parties to be
heard; and (d) a final, binding decision, or award by the third party after the hearing”).
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to trade the formal process of court-based adjudication for
efficiency and equity.25 It is generally considered a speedy and
efficient form of dispute resolution, as it uses streamlined
procedures to reach an outcome based on principles of law, equity,
and custom and practices unique to a particular industry.
The process has deep historical roots and is known to have
been used in the United States to resolve internal industry
disputes dating back to colonial times.26 Historically, however,
judges were hostile to arbitration and refused to enforce
predispute arbitration agreements (PDAAs), instead treating
them as revocable.27 This “revocability doctrine,” which declared
PDAAs unenforceable and revocable, stemmed from two grounds.
First, courts viewed arbitrators as improperly ousting courts of
their jurisdiction. Second, courts were reluctant to compel parties
to participate in arbitration when courts could not ensure that the
arbitration process would be fair and equitable.28 This judicial
hostility limited disputants’ use of arbitration to resolve
commercial disputes.
B.

The Rise of Modern Arbitration Statutes

Increased court congestion in the early twentieth century
and the growing popularity of arbitration as a cheaper and faster
means of resolving disputes arising out of commercial transactions
led merchants, particularly in New York, to lobby for an arbitration
statute.29 The drafters of the 1920 New York Arbitration Act,30 the
first arbitration statute in the country, intended it to reverse the
common law revocability doctrine.31 Congress followed soon after
by passing the 1925 U.S. Arbitration Act, now known as the FAA,
to reverse the ancient judicial hostility to arbitration.32 By
25 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
628 (1985) (“By agreeing to arbitrate . . . , [a party] trades the procedures and
opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition
of arbitration.”).
26 See Edward Brunet, Replacing Folklore Arbitration with a Contract Model of
Arbitration, 74 TUL. L. REV. 39, 43 (1999) (describing historical roots of “folklore”
arbitration); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under
the Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931, 969-72 (1999) [hereinafter Stone, Rustic
Justice] (describing the history of arbitration). George Washington’s 1789 Last Will and
Testament included an arbitration clause. See David Horton, The Federal Arbitration Act
and Testamentary Instruments, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1027, 1035 (2012).
27 Stone, Rustic Justice, supra note 26, at 973-74 (describing nineteenthcentury courts’ reluctance to enforce PDAAs).
28 Id. at 975-76.
29 See SZALAI, supra note 24, at 21-25; Stone, Rustic Justice, supra note 26, at 979.
30 Arbitration Law, 1920 N.Y. Laws 803 (codified as amended at N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 7501-14 (McKinney 2015)).
31 See generally SZALAI, supra note 24 (detailing legislative history of the FAA).
32 Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006).
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declaring arbitration agreements as enforceable as any other kind
of contract in the FAA’s primary substantive section (section 2),33
Congress eliminated lower courts’ ability to refuse to enforce a
PDAA simply on the ground that it was an agreement to
arbitrate. Unless the ground for revocation, such as fraud, duress
or unconscionability, applied generally to all contracts, the ground
for revocation was not available.34
C.

Characteristics of Twentieth-Century Arbitration

The FAA does not define “arbitration,”35 though the
legislative history suggests that FAA proponents envisioned a
process in which a neutral party provided disputants with an
opportunity to be heard and imposed a final and binding
resolution of the dispute.36 Early twentieth-century arbitration (the
type that existed when the FAA was passed) was characterized as
simple, speedy, and inexpensive.37 Early twentieth-century
arbitrators were experts in the dispute’s subject matter and applied
their understanding of custom, industry practice, and principles
of law and equity to decide the merits.38 Parties selected their own
arbitrators, the process involved minimal motion practice and
discovery, parties received a full and fair hearing via a flexible,
party-driven process (parties could tailor the process to fit their
needs), and the outcome was a final and binding award that

9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1203 (2012). For
a reconceptualization of the FAA’s purpose as promoting procedural reform rather than
freedom of contract, see Aragaki, supra note 11.
35 Jill I. Gross, Securities Mediation: Dispute Resolution for the Individual
Investor, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 329, 350 (2006) [hereinafter Gross,
Securities Mediation].
36 Id. at 355-56.
37 Julius Henry Cohen, The Law of Commercial Arbitration and the New York
Statute, 31 YALE L.J. 147, 148 (1921) (“The experience of many business men and
lawyers testifies to the advantage of these methods of adjusting differences [by
arbitration] wherever possible. They are inexpensive, speedy and peaceful.” (quoting
proceedings of New York State Bar Association Committee on the Prevention of
Unnecessary Litigation)).
38 See Stone, Rustic Justice, supra note 26, at 971-72; Moses H. Cone Mem’l
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 11 (1983). For example, diamond merchants
arguing over the quality of a delivery relied on a diamond expert to resolve a dispute. See
Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the
Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992). Cotton merchants looked to experts in
the cotton industry to resolve disputes with cotton mills. See Lisa Bernstein, Private
Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms,
and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1728 (2001). Investors who had disputes with
their brokers had securities industry members with an understanding of the industry’s
customs and practices arbitrate their disputes. Gross, Securities Mediation, supra note
35, at 336-38 (describing the history of securities arbitration).
33
34
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parties could appeal on limited grounds.39 Participants perceived
that the process delivered rough though speedy justice and was
fair.40 In fact, widely held perceptions of overall fairness fueled the
business community’s late twentieth-century flight from
congested courts to arbitration.41
D.

Characteristics of Twenty-First Century Arbitration

With its explosion in popularity, arbitration evolved into a
different process than that practiced when Congress enacted the
FAA.42 Though it still retains the hallmarks of a binding decision
by a neutral decision maker after a hearing, as actually practiced
today in the most oft-used forums, such as the American
Arbitration Association (AAA),43 JAMS,44 and Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority (FINRA) Dispute Resolution,45 arbitration
involves more formalities and litigation-like processes. In turn,
these formalities increase costs due to more expansive discovery,
prehearing conferences, and motion practice.46 For example,
FINRA arbitration now includes complex procedures for serving
subpoenas;47 AAA commercial arbitration rules list 19 different
39 Brunet, supra note 26, at 43-44 (describing features of nineteenth and
early twentieth-century arbitration).
40 See Stone, Rustic Justice, supra note 26, at 976-77.
41 Thomas J. Stipanowich & J. Ryan Lamare, Living with ADR: Evolving
Perceptions and Use of Mediation, Arbitration and Conflict Management in Fortune 1000
Corporations, 19 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (2014) [hereinafter Stipanowich & Lamare,
Living with ADR] (reporting that “[f]or much of the latter half of the twentieth century, outof-court dispute resolution centered on binding arbitration as an alternative to litigation of
commercial disputes,” and participants generally were satisfied with the process); Stone,
Rustic Justice, supra note 26, at 956-57 (attributing growth of arbitration in the late
twentieth century to “near universal disdain for civil litigation” and appeal of arbitration to
its “speed, accessibility, economy and substantive justice”).
42 Kovach & Love, supra note 5, at 90 (1998) (“The evolution of arbitration
exemplifies how a dispute resolution process can begin as a true alternative to
litigation and then gradually migrate towards the prevailing norm. Arbitration has
assumed problems similar to those of litigation, and, in the process, has lost many
features that made it appealing initially.”).
43 See AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, http://www.adr.org [http://perma.cc/
8KYC-KXDS] (last visited Dec. 6, 2015).
44 See JAMS, http://www.jamsadr.com [http://perma.cc/9E5H-VKKH] (last visited
Dec. 6, 2015). The name JAMS evolved from the company’s origins as J*A*M*S, an acronym
for Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services. See About the JAMS Name, JAMS,
http://www.jamsadr.com/about-the-jams-name/ [http://perma.cc/6KMY-PZK5] (last visited
Dec. 6, 2015).
45 See Arbitration and Mediation, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/Arbitration
AndMediation/ [http://perma.cc/3QH6-7MVP] (last visited Dec. 6, 2015).
46 See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The “New Litigation,” 2010 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1, 12-19 (2010) (describing changes in the nature of arbitration that made it
more like litigation).
47 FINRA, CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE FOR CUSTOMER DISPUTES r. 12512
(2008) [hereinafter FINRA, CUSTOMER CODE]; FINRA, CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE
FOR INDUSTRY DISPUTES r. 13512 (2008) [hereinafter FINRA, INDUSTRY CODE].
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topics that arbitrators should cover during a prehearing
conference;48 and JAMS arbitration rules explicitly permit
arbitrators to admit deposition testimony into evidence.49
Arbitrator selection methods have also evolved in recent
times. Today, parties usually select their arbitrators pursuant
to forum rules and from the forum’s roster, and not all forums
permit the parties to select an arbitrator with expertise in the
subject matter of the dispute.50 In particular, under most
forums’ procedures, the smaller the dollar value of the claim,
48 AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, r. R-21, r. P-2
(2013) [hereinafter AAA, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES]. The 19 topics (not
counting subtopics) are:

(i) the possibility of other non-adjudicative methods of dispute resolution,
including mediation pursuant to R-9; (ii) whether all necessary or appropriate
parties are included in the arbitration; (iii) whether a party will seek a more
detailed statement of claims, counterclaims or defenses; (iv) whether there
are any anticipated amendments to the parties’ claims, counterclaims, or
defenses; (v) which (a) arbitration rules; (b) procedural law; and (c)
substantive law govern the arbitration; (vi) whether there are any threshold
or dispositive issues that can efficiently be decided without considering the
entire case, . . . (vii) whether the parties will exchange documents, including
electronically stored documents, on which they intend to rely in the
arbitration, and/or make written requests for production of documents within
defined parameters; (viii) whether to establish any additional procedures to
obtain information that is relevant and material to the outcome of disputed
issues; (ix) how costs of any searches for requested information or documents
that would result in substantial costs should be borne; (x) whether any
measures are required to protect confidential information; (xi) whether the
parties intend to present evidence from expert witnesses, and if so, whether
to establish a schedule for the parties to identify their experts and exchange
expert reports; (xii) whether, according to a schedule set by the arbitrator,
the parties will (a) identify all witnesses, the subject matter of their
anticipated testimonies, exchange written witness statements, and determine
whether written witness statements will replace direct testimony at the
hearing; (b) exchange and pre-mark documents that each party intends to
submit; and (c) exchange pre-hearing submissions, including exhibits; (xiii)
the date, time and place of the arbitration hearing; (xiv) whether, at the
arbitration hearing, (a) testimony may be presented in person, in writing, by
videoconference, via the internet, telephonically, or by other reasonable
means; (b) there will be a stenographic transcript or other record of the
proceeding and, if so, who will make arrangements to provide it; (xv) whether
any procedure needs to be established for the issuance of subpoenas; (xvi) the
identification of any ongoing, related litigation or arbitration; (xvii) whether
post-hearing submissions will be filed; (xviii) the form of the arbitration
award; and (xix) any other matter the arbitrator considers appropriate or a
party wishes to raise.
Id. at r. P-2.
49 JAMS, COMPREHENSIVE ARBITRATION RULES AND PROCEDURES r. 22(e) (2014),
http://www.jamsadr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/JAMS-Rules/JAMS_comprehensive_
arbitration_rules-2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/U82N-9VGK] [hereinafter JAMS, ARBITRATION
RULES].
50 For example, FINRA customer arbitrations must include at least two
public arbitrators (on a three-member panel case) who are arbitrators with no
affiliations past or present with the securities industry. FINRA, CUSTOMER CODE,
supra note 47, r. 12403(a), (e).
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the less input the claimant has in arbitrator selection.51
Additionally, forum fees and neutral costs can escalate rapidly
to tens of thousands of dollars for complex disputes, and
hearings can drag on for months and even years.52
With the increased use of arbitration, litigation arising
from arbitration awards also has increased.53 Judges have had
more occasion to consider the grounds to vacate awards listed in
FAA section 10,54 as well as the grounds to modify or correct
awards listed in FAA section 11,55 and have construed those
grounds narrowly.56 The resulting body of law makes it extremely
difficult to overturn an award on any ground other than a
51 For example, under the AAA commercial arbitration rules, for claims
under $75,000, parties receive only one list of five names from which they must choose
their arbitrator. See AAA, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 48, r. E-4. In
contrast, for claims above $75,000, parties have a wider choice of arbitrator
appointment methods, including a list of 10 names if the parties proceed via the roster
appointment method. Id. r. R-12, L-2. In addition, at a recent AAA arbitrator training,
AAA staff confirmed orally to me that, generally, parties had more input into arbitrator
selection as the value of the claim increased.
52 See Stipanowich, supra note 46, at 9 (describing corporate counsel
bemoaning the loss of speed and cost advantages in modern arbitration).
53 See, e.g., Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, Happily Never After: When
Final and Binding Arbitration Has No Fairy Tale Ending, 13 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV.
167, 205 (2008) (describing results of empirical study of employment arbitration
awards showing that “court review of arbitration is rapidly growing”).
54 Those grounds are:

(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or
either of them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone
the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence
pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by
which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed
them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter
submitted was not made.
9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2012).
55 Those grounds are:
(a) Where there was an evident material miscalculation of figures or an
evident material mistake in the description of any person, thing, or property
referred to in the award.
(b) Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to
them, unless it is a matter not affecting the merits of the decision upon the
matter submitted.
(c) Where the award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of
the controversy.
9 U.S.C. § 11 (2012).
56 See Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2068 (2013) (“Under
the FAA, courts may vacate an arbitrator’s decision ‘only in very unusual circumstances.’”
(quoting First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995))).
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fundamental defect in the process.57 In particular, arbitrator
error, no matter how egregious, is not a ground for vacatur.58 And
the Supreme Court has blocked parties from expanding by
contract the grounds for vacating FAA-governed awards.59
Contemporary arbitration is not a one-size-fits-all process;
rather, the mechanism has branched out into several different
variants—creating pluralism within one process. Different
industries use different types of arbitration, each featuring
procedures and norms unique to the industry. The AAA has
developed unique rules for more than a dozen different types of
arbitration.60 For instance, labor arbitration procedures differ
from those of securities arbitration.61 Labor arbitrators typically
write reasoned awards; FINRA arbitrators rarely do.62 Investorstate arbitration and international commercial arbitration are
other varieties of arbitration practiced in the transnational arena,
typically with arbitration selection methods different from those
in the domestic arena.63 As these all involve interstate commerce,
they are governed by the FAA, yet describing them as the same
process is a misleading oversimplification.
57 Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 586 (2008) (stating that
grounds for vacatur listed in FAA section 10(a) all “address egregious departures from
the parties’ agreed-upon arbitration”).
58 Oxford Health Plans, 133 S. Ct. at 2071 (stating that when evaluating a
vacatur challenge alleging that arbitrators exceeded their powers, the only question for
the court under section 10(a)(4) “is not whether the arbitrator construed the parties’
contract correctly, but whether he construed it at all”).
59 Hall St., 552 U.S. at 586 (holding that “the text [of the FAA] compels a reading
of the §§ 10 and 11 categories as exclusive”).
60 See Rule Search Result, AM. ARBITRATION ASSOC., https://www.adr.org/aaa/
faces/rules/searchrules/rulesearchresult?x_rule_status=A&_afrLoop=129962718894948&_af
rWindowMode=0&_afrWindowId=ro1wt9gu8_152#%40%3F_afrWindowId%3Dro1wt9gu8_1
52%26_afrLoop%3D129962718894948%26x_rule_status%3DA%26_afrWindowMode%3D0
%26_adf.ctrl-state%3Dro1wt9gu8_192 [http://perma.cc/SER6-2CEZ] (last visited Dec. 6,
2015) (listing arbitration rules for accounting, class, commercial, construction, consumer,
employment, healthcare payor provider, insurance, international, labor, Olympic sport
doping, and wireless industry arbitration).
61 Kovach & Love, supra note 5, at 90-91 (“In labor arbitration, a ‘trend to
legalism’ has developed, at least partly, because lawyers have brought to hearings the
trappings of courtrooms: formality, objections, transcripts, briefs, and case citations.”).
62 Compare AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, LABOR ARBITRATION RULES r. 37 (2013)
(“The parties shall advise the AAA whenever they do not require the arbitrator to
accompany the award with an opinion.”), with FINRA, CUSTOMER CODE, supra note 47, r.
12904(g). See also Walton v. Cantor Fitzgerald & Co., [2015-03] Securities Arbitration Alert
(Sec. Arb. Commentator) (Jan. 22, 2015) (reporting that the 2009 amendment to the FINRA
arbitration code that required arbitrators to write an explanation of an award if the parties
jointly request one has “resulted in the issuance of only 17 explained Awards”).
63 See, e.g., INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMMERCE, INT’L COURT OF ARBITRATION, ICC
RULES OF ARBITRATION arts. 12-13, http://iccwbo.org/products-and-services/arbitration-andadr/arbitration/icc-rules-of-arbitration/#article_11 [http://perma.cc/9Y94-VP6N] (describing
arbitrator appointment process for international arbitration in the International Chamber
of Commerce (ICC), which involves nomination by parties or appointment by the Court of
Arbitration rather than list selection).

2015]

E.

JUSTICE SCALIA’S HAT TRICK

123

Arbitrability Challenges

As more parties to commercial transactions added
PDAAs to their contracts, challenges to the arbitrability of
disputes increased. When parties entered into a PDAA, they
may not have known what dispute might arise, if any, or more
commonly today, one party may not have known that there was
a PDAA in the contract.64 Once a dispute arises, one party may
no longer want to arbitrate for a variety of reasons. Parties
may not believe that the forum is suitable for resolving the
dispute that did arise, such as any kind of discrimination claim
or some other complex, federal statutory claim. Others may
perceive the forum as unfair. Still others may not fully
understand the process, and that lack of knowledge produces
skepticism and fear. So the reluctant party may challenge the
existence of a valid arbitration agreement or argue that, even if
there is an agreement, it does not cover the dispute.
The Supreme Court has provided ample guidance in
connection with those arbitrability challenges. Since 2000
alone, the Court has accepted more than 25 cases involving
arbitration that required an interpretation of the FAA—about
the same number as all the cases decided in the first 75 years
under the Act.65 More than half of the decisions since 2000
involved arbitration at the American Arbitration Association.66
An overwhelming majority arose out of mandatory arbitration
clauses in labor or employment contracts, consumer products or
services agreements, or customer agreements in the financial
services industries. More than half involved an interpretation
of the FAA’s section 2.67
64 A recent study indicated that 91% of consumers surveyed did not know
there was an arbitration clause in their contract that prevented them from bringing
their claims in court. See Jeff Sovern, Elayne E. Greenberg, Paul F. Kirgis & Yuxiang
Liu, “Whimsy Little Contracts” with Unexpected Consequences: An Empirical Analysis
of Consumer Understanding of Arbitration Agreements 50 (St. John’s Legal Studies
Research Paper No. 14-0009, 2015) [hereinafter Whimsy Little Contracts].
65 My research yielded 30 decisions from 1925 to 1999.
66 Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064 (2013); Nitro-Lift Techs.,
L.L.C. v. Howard, 133 S. Ct. 500 (2012); Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S.
Ct. 1201 (2012); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); Stolt-Nielsen
S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010); Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle,
556 U.S. 624 (2009); Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346 (2008); Citizens Bank v. Alafabco,
Inc., 539 U.S. 52 (2003); Pacificare Health Sys., Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401 (2003); EEOC
v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002); Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Constr.
Co., 529 U.S. 193 (2000); Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
67 Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013); Nitro-Lift
Techs., 133 S. Ct. 500; Marmet Health Care, 132 S. Ct. 1201; CompuCredit Corp. v.
Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012); Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740; KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, 132
S. Ct. 23 (2011); Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287 (2010); Rent-ACenter, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (2010); Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. 662; Preston, 552
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The Court’s numerous decisions in FAA-related cases
have contributed to the rapid development of the federal
substantive law of arbitrability. Starting in the 1980s, the
Court has held that courts must apply a presumption of
arbitrability when deciding such claims,68 the FAA applies to
arbitration clauses in all agreements “involving commerce,”69
and federal statutory claims are arbitrable as a matter of
public policy unless Congress explicitly says they are not.70
Moreover, the Court has made it clear that in both federal and
state courts, the FAA preempts conflicting state law, including
state consumer protection laws that try to shield consumers
from unfair PDAAs.71 The Court’s twenty-first-century
arbitrability decisions have had the cumulative effect of
eliminating virtually all arbitrability defenses and converting
PDAAs into “super contracts.”72 The next Part demonstrates
just how far the judiciary has evolved from its hostility towards
PDAAs to its strong endorsement of them under the FAA.
II.

JUSTICE SCALIA’S HAT TRICK: CONCEPCION,
COMPUCREDIT, AND ITALIAN COLORS

The Court decided perhaps the three most important
modern arbitration law cases in rapid succession at the end of its
term in each of the years 2011, 2012, and 2013, and Justice Scalia
U.S. 346; Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006); Alafabco, 539
U.S. 52; Randolph, 531 U.S. 79.
68 Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 11 (1983).
69 By its terms, the FAA governs agreements to arbitrate “transactions involving
commerce.” 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). The Supreme Court has interpreted this phrase broadly to
include any transaction that in fact involves interstate commerce, even if the parties did not
anticipate an interstate impact. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265,
273-74, 281 (1995) (interpreting the reach of the FAA broadly to include all transactions
“involving commerce” and stating that “‘involving’ is broad and is indeed the functional
equivalent of ‘affecting’”); Alafabco, 539 U.S. 52 (applying the FAA to debt restructuring
agreements as “involving commerce”); Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79
(2002) (applying FAA to securities arbitrations).
70 See CompuCredit, 132 S. Ct. at 669.
71 See Nitro-Lift Techs., 133 S. Ct. 500 (preempting Oklahoma Supreme Court’s
invalidation of a noncompetition agreement on the grounds that under the FAA, the
arbitrator determines the enforceability of underlying contracts); Marmet Health Care, 132
S. Ct. at 1203 (preempting West Virginia rule prohibiting enforcement of predispute
agreements to arbitrate wrongful death claims against nursing homes); Doctor’s Assocs.,
Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 683 (1996) (preempting Montana statute requiring specific
type of notice in contract containing arbitration clause); Allied-Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. at
272-73 (preempting Alabama statute invalidating PDAAs in consumer contracts); Perry v.
Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 488-89 (1987) (preempting California statute requiring wage
collection actions to be resolved in court).
72 See Richard Frankel, The Arbitration Clause as Super Contract, 91 WASH.
U. L. REV. 531 (2014); Stipanowich, supra note 46, at 9 (“In the twentieth century, predispute (or ‘executory’) arbitration agreements evolved from disfavored status to
judicially denominated ‘super-clauses.’”).
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wrote the majority opinion for each one.73 These three cases,
which I collectively refer to as the “Hat Trick” decisions, sharply
reduced defenses available to parties to challenge the enforcement
of arbitration agreements. This Part describes these cases and
explains their significance to modern arbitration law and
identifies a factual error that the Court made in Italian Colors.
This error is characteristic of the Court’s recent FAA decisions,
which reflect either a misunderstanding or mischaracterization of
how arbitration works in the twenty-first century.
A.

The Hat Trick Decisions
1. Concepcion

In April 2011, in AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion,74 the
Court ruled that the FAA preempts California’s Discover Bank
rule, which “classif[ied] most collective-arbitration waivers in
consumer contracts as unconscionable.”75 Vincent and Liza
Concepcion accepted an AT&T Mobility offer for a free cell phone.
When they discovered they were charged $30.22 in sales tax, the
Concepcions sued AT&T Mobility in federal district court on
behalf of a class of similarly situated consumers, alleging that
AT&T Mobility’s “practice of charging sales tax on a cell phone
advertised as ‘free’ was fraudulent.”76
After the Concepcions’ case was consolidated with
another putative class action alleging, inter alia, identical
claims of false advertising and fraud, AT&T Mobility moved to
compel individual arbitration under the PDAA in the cellular
phone service contract.77 That PDAA included a provision
prohibiting plaintiffs from bringing class-wide arbitrations,
instead requiring arbitration of claims on an individual basis.
The district court refused to enforce the arbitration
agreement on the grounds that the class action waiver was
73 Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309-10 (2013)
(holding that claimants can establish they cannot vindicate their federal statutory
rights only if they show they are stripped of the right to pursue them, not the ability to
pursue them); CompuCredit, 132 S. Ct. at 669 (reaffirming that federal statutory
claims are arbitrable absent an explicit “contrary congressional command”); AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (ruling that class action waivers in
consumer agreements are not per se unconscionable).
74 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740.
75 Id. at 1746. In Discover Bank v. Superior Court of L.A., 113 P.3d 1100,
1103 (Cal. 2005), the California Supreme Court applied California’s unconscionability
law to void class action waivers in arbitration agreements.
76 Laster v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 853 (9th Cir. 2009).
Concepcion was consolidated with Laster in September 2006.
77 Id. at 852.
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unconscionable under Discover Bank.78 The Ninth Circuit affirmed,
and AT&T Mobility secured review in the Supreme Court.79
In a 5-4 decision authored by Justice Scalia,80 the Court
held that the FAA preempts California’s Discover Bank
interpretation of the state’s unconscionability rule. The Court
concluded that the Discover Bank rule created a different law
of unconscionability for a special type of contract: an adhesive
PDAA with a class action waiver.81 Thus, the Court held that
the FAA preempts the Discover Bank rule, as the rule treats
arbitration clauses differently than nonarbitration contracts.82
Persuaded by research demonstrating that state courts
had become more likely to find arbitration agreements
unconscionable than nonarbitration contracts,83 the Court
concluded that the Discover Bank rule was “tantamount to a rule
Id. at 853-54.
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1745.
80 Id. Joining Justice Scalia in the majority were Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice
Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, filed a dissenting opinion.
81 The Supreme Court noted that, under California law, a court may refuse to
enforce a contract that it finds “to have been unconscionable at the time it was made,”
or it may “limit the application of any unconscionable clause.” Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at
1746 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. § 1670.5(1) (1985)). “A finding of unconscionability
requires a ‘procedural’ and a ‘substantive’ element, the former focusing on ‘oppression’
or ‘surprise’ due to unequal bargaining power, the latter on ‘overly harsh’ or ‘one-sided’
results.” Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746 (citations omitted). The Discover Bank court
applied the unconscionability statute and resulting doctrine to class action waivers in
PDAAs and reasoned:
78
79

[W]hen the waiver is found in a consumer contract of adhesion in a setting in
which disputes between the contracting parties predictably involve small
amounts of damages, and when it is alleged that the party with the superior
bargaining power has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large
numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of money, then . . . the
waiver becomes in practice the exemption of the party “from responsibility for
[its] own fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of another.” Under
these circumstances, such waivers are unconscionable under California law
and should not be enforced.
Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1110 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668 (West 2015)).
82 Under the FAA preemption doctrine, the FAA preempts any state law that
“actually conflicts with federal law—that is, to the extent that it ‘stands as an obstacle
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’”
Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477
(1989) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). The Court has repeatedly
held that the FAA preempts conflicting state law. See, e.g., Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C. v.
Howard, 133 S. Ct. 500 (2012) (preempting Oklahoma Supreme Court rule that a court,
not an arbitrator, determines the validity of a covenant not to compete in a contract
containing an arbitration clause); Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct.
1201 (2012) (preempting West Virginia Supreme Court rule voiding as against public
policy PDAAs in nursing home contracts with respect to negligence claims); Buckeye
Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006) (preempting Florida judicial rule
that precluded arbitrators from deciding the legality of an allegedly usurious contract
containing a PDAA).
83 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1747.
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of nonenforceability of arbitration agreements.”84 The Court noted
that, although California’s “rule does not require classwide
arbitration, it allows any party to a consumer contract to demand
it ex post,” thus defeating the purposes of the FAA.85 The Court
discussed three characteristics of class arbitration that it
concluded defeated the FAA’s purposes and hindered the flexible,
party-driven process of arbitration: (1) it “sacrifices the principal
advantage of arbitration—its informality”; (2) it “requires
procedural formality”; and (3) it “increases risks to defendants”
due to the lack of judicial review.86 In response to the dissent’s
concern that class proceedings are necessary to protect against
small-value claims falling through the cracks of the legal
system,87 Justice Scalia wrote that “[s]tates cannot require a
procedure that is inconsistent with the FAA, even if it is desirable
for unrelated reasons.”88
Harsh criticism of Concepcion immediately followed.89 By
limiting the use of a state’s unconscionability doctrine to void
class action waivers, the Court made it more difficult for
consumers and employees to bring class action claims. The
Court in Concepcion thus further incentivized companies to
insert class action waivers in adhesive contracts.90
2. CompuCredit
The following year, the Court in CompuCredit v.
Greenwood 91 reiterated the doctrine first articulated in the late

84 Jill I. Gross, AT&T Mobility and FAA Over-Preemption, 4 Y.B. ON ARB. &
MEDIATION 25, 29 (2012).
85 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1750.
86 Id. at 1751-52.
87 Id. at 1760-61 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
88 Id. at 1753.
89 See, e.g., Sarah Rudolph Cole, On Babies and Bathwater: The Arbitration
Fairness Act and the Supreme Court’s Recent Arbitration Jurisprudence, 48 HOUS. L.
REV. 457 (2011) [hereinafter Cole, On Babies and Bathwater] (critiquing current
arbitration law after Concepcion because it prevents claimants from pursuing low
value claims); Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the
Wake of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623 (2012); Judith Resnik,
Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and
Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78 (2011); Sternlight, Tsunami, supra note 23, at
704; Maureen A. Weston, The Death of Class Arbitration after Concepcion?, 60 U. KAN.
L. REV. 767 (2012). But see Christopher R. Drahozal, FAA Preemption after Concepcion,
35 BERKELEY. J. EMP. & LAB. L. 153, 154 (2014) (arguing that “in several respects, the
impact of Concepcion has been overstated”).
90 See Sternlight, Tsunami, supra note 23, at 704 (“By permitting companies
to use arbitration clauses to exempt themselves from class actions, Concepcion will
provide companies with free rein to commit fraud, torts, discrimination, and other
harmful acts without fear of being sued.”).
91 CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012).
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1980s92 that claims arising under federal statutes are arbitrable
as a matter of public policy absent a “contrary congressional
command.”93 The CompuCredit plaintiffs were individuals who
had applied for and received a credit card marketed by
CompuCredit and issued by defendant Columbus Bank & Trust.94
Plaintiffs alleged that CompuCredit marketed the credit card as
a means to rebuild the cardholder’s poor credit by immediately
granting a $300 line of credit but failed to disclose that the
cardholder would be assessed fees against the credit limit,
sharply reducing the available credit.95
Plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit against CompuCredit
and the issuing bank in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California under the Credit Repair Organizations Act
(CROA),96 a consumer-protection statute barring deceptive
practices by credit repair organizations. The district court denied
defendants’ motion to compel arbitration, holding that “Congress
intended claims arising under the CROA to be non-arbitrable.”97
The Ninth Circuit affirmed, disagreeing with two other circuits
and reasoning that Congress intended to preclude arbitration of
claims arising under the CROA when it provided consumers with
a “right to sue” violators of the statute.98
In an 8-1 decision, the Supreme Court resolved the circuit
split. Justice Scalia’s majority opinion concluded that the CROA’s
disclosure provision requiring credit repair organizations to notify
consumers that they “have a right to sue a credit repair
organization that violates the Credit Repair Organization Act”
does not reflect congressional intent to preclude arbitration of
claims arising under the Act.99 The Court similarly concluded that
the Act’s nonwaiver provision, which voids enforcement of a
consumer’s waiver of protections and rights under the CROA, did
not render unenforceable an arbitration agreement that waives
the right to bring CROA claims in court.100 These two provisions—
92 A notable example is the Court’s watershed decision, Shearson/Am.
Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (holding that claims arising under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are arbitrable).
93 CompuCredit, 132 S. Ct. at 669 (quoting McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
94 Id. at 668.
95 Id. at 676 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
96 15 U.S.C. § 1679 (2012).
97 CompuCredit, 132 S. Ct. at 668.
98 Greenwood v. CompuCredit Corp., 615 F.3d 1204, 1206-07 (9th Cir. 2010).
99 CompuCredit, 132 S. Ct. at 669-70 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1679(c) (2012)).
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, and Alito joined the
majority opinion. Justices Sotomayor and Kagan concurred in the judgment. Justice
Ginsburg dissented. Id. at 667-68.
100 Id. at 670-71. The nonwaiver provision reads: “[a]ny waiver by any
consumer of any protection provided by or any right of the consumer under this
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disclosure and nonwaiver—did not create a consumer’s right to
bring a CROA claim in court; they created only a consumer’s right
to receive the statutory notice.101 Thus, the provisions did not
constitute a “contrary congressional command” sufficient to
overcome the default rule that federal statutory claims are
arbitrable. Such a command must be far more explicit.102
As a result of CompuCredit, unless Congress explicitly
states in a statute that claims created by that or any other statute
are not arbitrable103 or delegates the power to decide the
arbitrability of claims to an administrative agency,104 a plaintiff
will be hard pressed to show that Congress intended to supersede
the FAA’s mandate to enforce arbitration agreements as written.
3. Italian Colors
In the third case, Italian Colors,105 a group of merchants
sued in federal court, challenging some of the terms in the
agreement American Express imposed on merchants that
accepted customers’ payments on American Express charge
subchapter—(1) shall be treated as void; and (2) may not be enforced by any Federal or
State court or any other person.” 15 U.S.C. § 1679f(a)).
101 CompuCredit, 132 S. Ct. at 669-70.
102 The Court cited a few examples of congressional language more explicit
than that in the CROA, including: “No predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid
or enforceable, if the agreement requires arbitration of a dispute arising under this
section.” Id. at 672 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 26(n)(2) (Supp. IV 2006)).
103 For example, § 922 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010), declares that
PDAAs purporting to require arbitration of whistleblower claims arising under the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002), are not
enforceable. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(e)(2) (2012) (“No predispute arbitration agreement shall be
valid or enforceable, if the agreement requires arbitration of a dispute arising under this
section.”). Section 806 of SOX gives a right of action to “whistleblowers” who report fraud at
publicly traded companies. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2012).
104 In Dodd-Frank, Congress amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78a-78pp (2012), to give the SEC explicit authority to prohibit, or to impose
conditions or limitations on the use of,
agreements that require customers or clients . . . to arbitrate any future
dispute between them arising under the Federal securities laws, the rules
and regulations thereunder, or the rules of a self-regulatory organization if it
finds that such prohibition, imposition of conditions, or limitations are in the
public interest and for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78o(o). Also in Dodd-Frank, Congress created the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (CFPB) and gave the CFPB the authority to adopt rules to “prohibit
or impose conditions or limitations” on the use of PDAAs if it finds that such rules are
“in the public interest and for the protection of consumers.” Dodd-Frank § 1011, 12
U.S.C. § 5491 (2012); Dodd-Frank § 1028(b) (2012), 12 U.S.C. § 5518 (2012). For an
analysis of how an administrative agency’s delegated authority can supersede the FAA,
see Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Investor Protection Meets the Federal Arbitration Act,
1 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 1 (2012).
105 Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
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cards as constituting an illegal tying arrangement under the
federal antitrust laws.106 As in Concepcion and CompuCredit,
the parties’ agreement contained an arbitration clause and a
class action waiver. In response to defendant’s motion to
compel arbitration, the merchants challenged the enforceability
of the class action waiver, arguing that if they could not
proceed as a class, they had no financially reasonable means of
pursuing their antitrust claims.107 An expert estimated that if
the allegations were proven, an individual plaintiff’s maximum
recovery would be $12,850.108
After the district court granted the motion to compel
arbitration, the merchants appealed. Three times, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the class action waiver
was unenforceable under the “effective vindication” doctrine
because it precluded plaintiff merchants from vindicating their
statutory rights under the federal antitrust laws.109 That doctrine
allowed a disputant to argue that an arbitration agreement is
unenforceable if an unfair aspect of the arbitration process
precludes the party from vindicating its federal statutory rights.110
The rule was derived from the Supreme Court’s pronouncement
in Mitsubishi Motors that “so long as the prospective litigant
effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the
arbitral forum, the [federal] statute [providing that cause of
action] will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent
function.”111 The Second Circuit concluded that the merchant
plaintiffs had demonstrated through expert testimony that
pursuing their statutory claims individually, as opposed to
106 A tying arrangement is “an agreement by a party to sell one product but only
on the condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product, or at least
agrees that he will not purchase that product from any other supplier.” N. Pac. Ry. Co. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958). Tying arrangements may violate § 1 of the Sherman
Act, which prohibits “contracts . . . in restraint of trade.” 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
107 Antitrust claims are very expensive to litigate, as proof of collusion and
market power require extensive discovery and expert testimony. See, e.g., In re
Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 296 F. Supp. 2d 568, 577 (E.D. Pa. 2003).
108 Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2308.
109 See In re Am. Express Merch. Litig. (Amex I), 554 F.3d 300 (2d Cir. 2009); In re
Am. Express Merch. Litig. (Amex II), 634 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2011); In re Am. Express Merch.
Litig. (Amex III), 667 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2012), rev’d sub nom. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct.
2304 (2013). The Court of Appeals reconsidered Amex I in light of the Supreme Court’s
subsequent ruling in Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010)
(holding that arbitrators cannot apply their own policy views when construing an
arbitration agreement that is silent on the allowability of class arbitration), and
reconsidered Amex II in light of the Supreme Court’s 2011 ruling in Concepcion.
110 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614
(1985); see also Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 92 (2000)
(recognizing, in dicta, that if a party showed that pursuing its statutory claims through
arbitration would be prohibitively expensive, and thus it could not vindicate its
statutory rights, a court could validly refuse to enforce a PDAA).
111 Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 637.
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through class arbitration, would not be economically feasible,
“effectively depriving plaintiffs of the statutory protections of the
antitrust laws.”112
The Supreme Court reversed. In the 5-3 majority opinion,
Justice Scalia recognized the validity of the “effective vindication”
doctrine generally:
As we have described, the [effective vindication] exception finds its
origin in the desire to prevent “prospective waiver of a party’s right
to pursue statutory remedies.” That would certainly cover a provision
in an arbitration agreement forbidding the assertion of certain
statutory rights. And it would perhaps cover filing and
administrative fees attached to arbitration that are so high as to
make access to the forum impracticable.113

The Court held, however, that in this case, “the fact that it
is not worth the expense involved in proving a statutory remedy
does not constitute the elimination of the right to pursue that
remedy.”114 Because the class action waiver in the merchants’
charge card service agreements with American Express did not
eliminate the right to pursue individual claims under the
antitrust laws, the Court found the waiver enforceable.
Italian Colors’ sharp curtailment of the vindicating rights
doctrine surprised many scholars, including me, who thought the
doctrine served a valuable function as an escape valve from
adhesive arbitration clauses that contained one-sided
provisions.115 While the Court’s modern arbitration jurisprudence
sharply limited the defenses available to challenge an arbitration
contract, the effective vindication doctrine had seemed to remain
a defense to the enforcement of a clause that de facto (as opposed
to de jure) precluded a party from pursuing a claim. By limiting
the vindicating rights doctrine to the narrow situation where an
arbitration clause strips a party of the right to prove its case, or
where forum fees are “so high as to make access to the forum
impracticable,”116 the Court sealed off that escape valve—even
though other costs might make it unfeasible for the party to
pursue the case.
Amex III, 667 F.3d at 217.
Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2310-11 (internal citations omitted). Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito joined the majority opinion.
Id. at 2307. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, as he did in Concepcion. Id.
Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices Ginsburg and
Breyer. Justice Sotomayor did not participate in the decision. Id.
114 Id. at 2311.
115 See Aragaki, supra note 11, at 2020-21 (describing the Italian Colors
holding as “surprising” and proposing a new paradigm for the FAA to “breathe some
life back into” the vindicating rights doctrine).
116 Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2310-11.
112
113
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Consequences of Justice Scalia’s Hat Trick

Justice Scalia’s Hat Trick ensures that virtually no ground
exists to challenge an unfair arbitration clause. The resulting law
governing the enforceability of an arbitration agreement is
arguably draconian. Courts must enforce arbitration agreements
according to their precise terms unless (1) there is an explicit
contrary congressional command; (2) the arbitration agreement
expressly strips one party of the substantive right to pursue a
federal statutory claim; or (3) a state law contract defense
invalidates the agreement, but only if that defense does not
discriminate against arbitration and does not frustrate the
purposes of the FAA.117 No longer do courts enforce PDAAs like all
other contracts; they may even enforce them in the face of common
law defenses to the enforcement of nonarbitration agreements.118
These developments have led to widespread criticism
that large corporations now use arbitration as a mechanism to
force consumers to give up their right to go to court and that
arbitration agreements ferry consumers into a forum that is
more hospitable to the repeat player, the large corporation.119
117 Id. (holding that claimants can establish they cannot vindicate their
federal statutory rights only if they show they are stripped of the right to pursue them,
not the ability to pursue them); see CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665,
665-67 (2012) (reaffirming that federal statutory claims are arbitrable absent an
explicit “contrary congressional command”); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.
Ct. 1740 (2011) (ruling that the FAA preempts the state law unconscionability defense,
which declares class action waivers in consumer arbitration agreements per se
unconscionable as inconsistent with the FAA); see also Sutherland v. Ernst & Young
LLP, 726 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that an arbitration agreement that waives
an employee’s ability to bring a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act is
enforceable under recent Supreme Court FAA cases); Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702
F.3d 1050 (8th Cir. 2013) (same); Walthour v. Chipio Windshield Repair, LLC, 745 F.3d
1326, 1327 (11th Cir. 2014) (same).
118 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (preempting state law unconscionability
doctrine that applied in both the litigation and arbitration contexts to uphold PDAA
with class action waiver). While Concepcion delivered a blow to courts’ use of the
unconscionability defense on a per se basis, even after Concepcion, some lower courts
continue to invalidate individual arbitration agreements on the grounds that they are
unconscionable. See Richard Frankel, Concepcion and Mis-Concepcion: Why
Unconscionability Survives the Supreme Court’s Arbitration Jurisprudence, 2014 J.
DISP. RESOL. 225, 242-49 (2014) (collecting cases).
119 See Schwartz, Claim-Suppressing Arbitration: The New Rules, supra note
23, at 240; Sternlight, Tsunami, supra note 23. Consumer advocates working to
eliminate mandatory arbitration of consumer, employment, and civil rights disputes
between parties of unequal bargaining power have coined the term “forced arbitration.”
See Forced Arbitration Rogues Gallery, PUBLIC CITIZEN, http://www.citizen.org/forcedarbitration-rogues-gallery [http://perma.cc/Y8WU-7RYC] (last visited Dec. 6, 2015);
Forced Arbitration, NAT’L ASS’N OF CONSUMER ADVOCS., http://www.consumeradvocates.org/
issues/forced-arbitration [http://perma.cc/8WQ9-YR4Q] (last visited Dec. 6, 2015);
Video, Lost in the Fine Print, ALLIANCE FOR JUST. (2014), http://www.afj.org/
multimedia/first-monday-films/films/lost-in-the-fine-print
[http://perma.cc/XG99-WMQV]
(last visited Dec. 6, 2015).
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Seemingly one-sided clauses hidden in consumer agreements are
enforceable, including class action waivers and provisions that
delegate the question of arbitrability itself to the arbitrators.120
While industry associations and corporate conglomerates tout
forced arbitration as a preferable device,121 some scholars write
about the parade of horribles that is modern arbitration law.122
They use dramatic words to describe these cases and the
resulting doctrine, including: “Flaunts and Flunks,”123 “Little
Monsters,”124 “Claim-Suppressing,”125 “Thwarted,”126 “Form Over
Fairness,”127 “Under Attack,”128 “Tragedy of Errors,”129 and
“Taming the Kraken.”130
120 Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (2010) (enforcing a clause
in an employment agreement delegating arbitrability questions to the arbitrator).
“Delegation” clauses in adhesive PDAAs may be problematic for consumers. See Karen
Halverson Cross, Letting the Arbitrator Decide Unconscionability Challenges, 26 OHIO
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 6 (2011) (arguing that “in the context of mandatory
arbitration of employment, franchise, and consumer disputes, such a delegation of
authority to the arbitrator effectively removes an important check (the
unconscionability doctrine) on the use of one-sided arbitration clauses”).
121 See, e.g., Arbitration and Dispute Resolution, MICROSOFT CORP. LEGAL
RESOURCES, http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/legal/arbitration/default.aspx [http://perma.cc/
9TC6-SZXZ] (last visited Dec. 6, 2015) (declaring that “[o]ur arbitration agreements offer
speedy and fair individual dispute resolution”); Pre-Dispute Arbitration Resource Center,
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, SEC. INDUSTRY & FIN. MKTS. ASS’N,
http://www.sifma.org/issues/legal,-compliance-and-administration/pre-dispute-arbitration/
overview/ [http://perma.cc/46TN-53FX] (last visited Dec. 6, 2015) (“securities arbitration
promotes fair, efficient, and economical dispute resolution for all parties”); Resolve a Dispute
With AT&T Via Arbitration, AT&T MOBILITY, http://www.att.com/esupport/article.
jsp?sid=KB72565&cv=820 [http://perma.cc/PSH5-VCXY] (last visited Dec. 6, 2015)
(explaining arbitration as a mechanism to meet AT&T’s commitment to “ensur[e] that any
dispute a customer may have is resolved in a fair, effective, and efficient manner”).
122 See Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of
Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2810
(2015) (arguing that “the cumulative impact of recent Supreme Court decisions on
arbitration also produces an unconstitutional system, providing insufficient oversight of
the processes it has mandated as a substitute for adjudication and shifting control over
third-party access away from courts and to the organizations conducting arbitrations and
the commercial enterprises drafting arbitration clauses”).
123 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Rhetoric Versus Reality in Arbitration
Jurisprudence: How the Supreme Court Flaunts and Flunks Contracts, 75 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 129 (2012).
124 See Stephen Friedman, Arbitration Provisions: Little Darlings and Little
Monsters, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2035 (2011).
125 Schwartz, supra note 23.
126 See Jodi Wilson, How the Supreme Court Thwarted the Purpose of the
Federal Arbitration Act, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 91 (2012).
127 See Michelle L. Caton, Form over Fairness: How the Supreme Court’s
Misreading of the Federal Arbitration Act Has Left Consumers in a Lurch, 21 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 497 (2014).
128 See Ramona L. Lampley, Is Arbitration Under Attack?: Exploring the
Recent Judicial Skepticism of the Class Arbitration Waiver and Innovative Solutions to
the Unsettled Legal Landscape, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 477 (2009).
129 See Gary Born & Claudio Salas, The United States Supreme Court and
Class Arbitration: A Tragedy of Errors, 2012 J. DISP. RESOL. 21 (2012).
130 See Mac R. McCoy & D. Matthew Allen, Taming the Kraken: The Supreme
Court Weighs in on Class Actions in 2011, BUS. L. TODAY, Jan. 2012, at 1.
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While I am reluctant to jump on the bandwagon, I do not
believe the Court reached defensible results in the Hat Trick
cases. The FAA should not have preempted California’s Discover
Bank doctrine, and the class action waiver should have been
found unconscionable in Concepcion. Congress’s use of “right to
sue” language should have been sufficient evidence of a
“contrary congressional command” in CompuCredit. And
plaintiffs’ demonstration that it was not financially feasible to
bring their antitrust claims individually in Italian Colors should
have resulted in a finding that the class arbitration waiver was
void as a matter of public policy because the plaintiffs could not
vindicate their statutory rights. How could the Court have
gotten it so wrong?
C.

Mistake in Italian Colors

Given the already-abundant literature critiquing the
Court’s recent arbitration jurisprudence,131 I sought to add
something new to the debate. A closer look at Italian Colors
reveals that, in part, Justice Scalia justified the holding to enforce
a class action waiver on the ground that the Court has done this
before. The Court cited Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp.132 as an example of when it previously enforced a class
action waiver in an arbitration agreement:
A pair of our cases brings home the point [that a class action waiver
does not equate to ineffective vindication]. In Gilmer, supra, we had no
qualms in enforcing a class waiver in an arbitration agreement even
though the federal statute at issue, the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, expressly permitted collective actions.133

Gilmer involved a claim arising under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) brought by an employee of a New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) member firm against his employer.134
When the firm fired Gilmer in 1987 at the age of 62, Gilmer sued
the brokerage firm.135 The firm moved to compel arbitration,
See supra notes 110-16 and accompanying text.
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
133 Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2311 (2013).
134 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23-24. Since 2007, when NYSE merged its arbitration
and enforcement functions into NASD to create FINRA, FINRA Dispute Resolution has
handled all NYSE arbitrations. See Press Release, FINRA, NASD and NYSE Member
Regulation Combine to Form the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority-FINRA (July
30, 2007), http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/NewsReleases/2007/P036329 [http://perma.cc/
A6QA-V79N].
135 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23-24. As a condition of employment with a brokerdealer, an associated person was required to sign a Uniform Application for Securities
Industry Registration (Form U-4), which provided in relevant part: “[I] agree to
arbitrate any dispute, claim or controversy [that may arise between me and my firm, or
131
132
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relying on NYSE and industry rules that required arbitration of
employment disputes.136 The district court denied the motion to
compel on the grounds that the ADEA claims were not arbitrable;
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed.137
The brokerage firm appealed to the Supreme Court, which
held that the employee’s ADEA claims were arbitrable. The Court
applied the presumption of arbitrability it first identified in Moses
H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.138 and
imposed the burden on the party opposing arbitration to show
that Congress intended “to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies
for the statutory rights at issue.”139 The Court explained its view
that arbitration can protect statutory rights: the process has
protections against biased arbitrators, offers sufficient discovery
procedures, and empowers arbitrators to issue written awards
and provide parties with broad equitable relief.140 In addition, an
award containing a written opinion explaining the outcome was
not necessary for the claimant to obtain appropriate relief.141 The
potential inequality in bargaining power was not enough to make
the claims nonarbitrable, in the Court’s view.142
Unlike what Justice Scalia wrote in Italian Colors, the
question of the availability of a class action for the employee
was never an issue in Gilmer. In fact, the parties did not enter
into a class action waiver in that case. The Fourth Circuit
quoted the arbitration agreements governing the parties’
dispute; those agreements said nothing about a class action
waiver.143 Rather, the NYSE as a forum had a policy expressed
through a rule that it would not accept class arbitrations;
investors or employees retained the right to bring those claims
in court.144 Notably, in approving amendments to that rule, the
a customer, or any other person,] that is required to be arbitrated under the rules,
constitutions, or by-laws of the organizations with which I register.” Id. at 23 (quoting
the Application). Gilmer signed a Form U-4 at the time of his hiring in 1981. In
addition, when an employee becomes a registered representative of the New York Stock
Exchange, that employee is subject to its Rule 347, which states: “Any controversy
between a registered representative and any member or member organization arising
out of the employment or termination of employment of such registered representative
[by and with such member or member organization shall be settled by arbitration].” Id.
(quoting NYSE Rule 347).
136 Id.
137 Id. at 24.
138 Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
139 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985)).
140 Id. at 30-32.
141 Id. at 31-32.
142 Id. at 32-33.
143 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 895 F.2d 195, 196-97 (4th Cir. 1990).
144 NYSE Rule 600(d) provides: “(i) a claim submitted as a class action claim shall
not be eligible for arbitration under the Rules of the [New York Stock] Exchange.” Rule
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Securities and Exchange Commission stated that “access to the
courts for class action litigation should be preserved for claims
filed by . . . associated persons against other members . . . , as
well as for claims involving investors.”145 Not only was there no
class action waiver—but the employee had the choice of
bringing his claim as part of a class action in court or in an
individual arbitration proceeding.146
Thus, the Italian Colors Court incorrectly described the
Gilmer arbitration agreement and the Gilmer arbitration forum’s
practices. The Court dispensed with the plaintiff merchants’
argument that class action waivers are not enforceable in the
context of a federal statute that permits collective actions based
on a plainly inaccurate retelling of the facts in Gilmer.
While I have little doubt that the Italian Colors Court
would have reached the same result even without the Gilmer
precedent, the error did provoke my thinking about what else the
Court might have gotten wrong in its arbitration cases. If Scalia’s
Hat Trick rests on inaccurate facts, assumptions, premises, and
understandings, then the holdings could collapse. So I looked
more closely at the Court’s factual statements in those cases. My
troubling findings follow.
IV.

THE SUPREME COURT’S DESCRIPTION OF TWENTY-FIRSTCENTURY ARBITRATION

In light of the Court’s mistaken premise in Italian Colors
that the parties in Gilmer had agreed to a class action waiver, I
searched for other mistakes in the Court’s recent arbitration
decisions. Specifically, I looked closely at how the Court described
the arbitration process and compared it to the current actual
practice of arbitration. To the extent the Court discusses the
arbitration process in its twenty-first-century opinions, it
consistently describes arbitration as it was practiced when
600(d)(iii) provides that no associated person or member firm can enforce an arbitration
agreement against the other if that party initiated in court a putative or certified class
action encompassing the claim, unless the class certification was denied, a certified class
was decertified, or the party was excluded or opted out of the class action. See ARBITRATION
RULES, N.Y. STOCK EXCH. r. 600(d)(iii), http://nyserules.nyse.com/nysetools/Platform
Viewer.asp?SelectedNode=chp_1_9&manual=/nyse/rules/nyse-rules/ [http://perma.cc/CW3523D9] (last visited Dec. 6, 2015).
145 Self-Regulatory Organizations; New York Stock Exchange, Inc.; Order
Granting Approval to Proposed Rule Change Relating to Amendments to Rules 600
(Arbitration), 619 (General. Provision Governing Subpoenas, Production. of Documents,
etc.), 629 (Schedule of Fees), and 637 (Failure to Honor Award), 60 Fed. Reg. 48576-01
(Sept. 19, 1995).
146 For a fuller discussion of the invalidity of class action waivers in the
securities industry, see Black & Gross, supra note 104.
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Congress enacted the FAA in the early twentieth century and not
as practiced in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century.
Thus, the Court premised its decisions on an outdated
understanding of many aspects of arbitration, including why
parties enter arbitration agreements, forum costs, speed of the
proceedings, how arbitrators are selected, the parties’ ability to
tailor the arbitration process to suit their needs, the arbitrators’
expertise, and the process for reviewing an award.147
Additionally, the opinions do not distinguish among the
many different types of arbitration practiced today—commercial,
labor, securities, consumer, international, and construction—nor
do they distinguish among the forums administering arbitrations
under different rules, including AAA, JAMS, CPR,148 FINRA, ICC,
and National Arbitration and Mediation (NAM).149 Each of these
arbitration types and forums vary in procedure from one
another,150 yet the Court’s descriptions of them make it seem as if
all modern arbitration is the same process.151 Below, I focus on
specific aspects of arbitration procedure as described by the
Supreme Court.
A.

Why Do Parties Enter into Arbitration Agreements?

First, consistent with its twentieth-century opinions,152 the
Court’s recent cases declare, without any factual basis, that
parties enter into arbitration agreements to save time and money.
Thus, the Court in 2008—quoting directly from a 1985 case—
stated the main purpose of an arbitration agreement is to
“achieve ‘streamlined proceedings and expeditious results.’”153 In
2010, the Court repeated its interpretation of parties’ intent when
entering into arbitration clauses: “In bilateral arbitration, parties
forgo the procedural rigor and appellate review of the courts in
order to realize the benefits of private dispute resolution: lower

147 Professor Brunet noted this trend in late twentieth-century arbitration court
opinions and commentary. See Brunet, supra note 26, at 40 (“Courts and commentators
emphasize these traits when they generalize about the term arbitration.”).
148 CPR:
INT’L
INST.
FOR
CONFLICT
PREVENTION
AND
RESOL.,
http://www.cpradr.org [http://perma.cc/M78Q-4BD9] (last visited Dec. 6, 2015).
149 NAT’L ARB. & MEDIATION, http://www.namadr.com [http://perma.cc/F23DHYGQ] (last visited Dec. 6, 2015).
150 See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
151 See Brunet, supra note 26, at 40 (critiquing the view of arbitration as “a
monolithic, one-dimensional concept with settled features that resemble a type of folklore”).
152 See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 633 (1985) (“[I]t is often a judgment that streamlined proceedings and expeditious
results will best serve their needs that causes parties to agree to arbitrate their disputes.”).
153 Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 357-58 (2008) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors,
473 U.S. at 633).
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costs, greater efficiency and speed, and the ability to choose
expert adjudicators to resolve specialized disputes.”154
This unilateral, inaccurate supposition that all parties to
all arbitration agreements have a singular purpose in agreeing to
arbitrate seems like a sweeping overgeneralization at best.
Parties enter into arbitration agreements for many reasons.155
Reasons can be procedural (e.g., parties perceive arbitration to be
cheaper and faster; parties want arbitrators, not juries, as
decision makers; parties want a neutral jurisdiction)156 or
substantive (parties prefer the dispute to be resolved under
particular rules; parties prefer decision makers who do not follow
legal rules; parties have a desire to preserve their
relationships).157 One empirical study identified at least 14
different reasons why parties stated they choose to arbitrate.158
Finally, parties might arbitrate because they have no choice.159
The Court has ignored the reality of the parties’ wildly varying
intentions when entering into PDAAs and built an edifice of
arbitrability law based on that fiction.
B.

Is Arbitration Less Expensive Than Litigation?

Second, without any supporting empirical evidence, the
Court has clung to the premise that arbitration is cheaper than
litigation. Thus, in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, the Court
proclaimed “[a]rbitration agreements allow parties to avoid the
costs of litigation, a benefit that may be of particular importance
in employment litigation.”160 In 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, the

Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 685 (2010).
See Christopher R. Drahozal, Why Arbitrate? Substantive Versus Procedural
Theories of Private Judging, 22 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 163, 186 (2011) (“Parties use arbitration
clauses in their contracts for a variety of reasons—some that might be characterized as
procedural and others that might be characterized as substantive.”); Christopher R.
Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses Use (or Not Use) Arbitration Clauses?, 25
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 433, 451-52 (2010) (summarizing empirical studies and
cataloguing at least 10 different reasons why parties might agree to arbitrate).
156 See Drahozal, Why Arbitrate?, supra note 155, at 172-75.
157 Id. at 175-77.
158 Stipanowich & Lamare, Living with ADR, supra note 41, at 36-37
(identifying reasons, such as arbitration: is “required by contract,” is “court mandated,” is
“desired by senior management,” “saves time,” “saves money,” “allows parties to resolve
disputes themselves,” “provides a more satisfactory process,” “has limited discovery,”
preserves “privacy and confidentiality,” “avoids establishing legal precedents,” “gives more
satisfactory settlements,” “provides . . . more durable resolution[s],” “preserves good
relationships,” and “uses expertise of third party neutral”).
159 For example, a recent study demonstrates that when consumers read a
consumer contract, many had no idea they had agreed to arbitrate disputes and that they
could not bring claims in court. See Whimsy Little Contracts, supra note 64, at 47-50.
160 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 123 (2001).
154
155
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Court repeated, “[p]arties generally favor arbitration precisely
because of the economics of dispute resolution.”161
Yet many scholars question the cost savings of modern
arbitration.162 Litigation-like arbitration procedures—including
extensive document and e-discovery, motion practice, and preand post-hearing briefs—have become far more common,
driving up arbitration costs dramatically.163 Businesses that are
less likely to use arbitration in the future cite high costs as one
of the reasons.164 At best, the empirical evidence gathered to
date is inconclusive as to whether arbitration is still less
expensive than litigation.165
Additionally, the cost savings vary greatly depending on
the amount of money at stake. Arbitration forums generally
charge a sliding scale of filing fees that grow in proportion to
the amount of damages claimed. The larger the claim, the more
the parties invoke extended discovery and motion practice.
Arbitration may be far more costly than litigation for a small
claim that could proceed in small claims court.166 Cost
advantages may exist only for very complex claims or for
disputes over large sums of money. Yet the Court has expanded
its arbitrability holdings based in part on the unsupported
premise that all commercial and consumer arbitration is less
expensive than litigation.
C.

Is Arbitration Faster Than Litigation?

Third, as with costs, the Court has assumed, without
evidence, that arbitration is faster than litigation. In Italian
Colors, the Court stated that “speedy resolution” is what
“arbitration in general and bilateral arbitration in particular
was meant to secure.”167 It cited no evidence regarding the
relative speed of a particular type of arbitration compared to a
comparable litigation. It failed to distinguish among different
14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 257 (2009).
See, e.g., Stipanowich & Lamare, Living with ADR, supra note 41, at 1, 5154, 64-65 (describing the modern commercial arbitration process as a costlier, more
litigation-like process); Kovach & Love, supra note 5, at 91.
163 Stipanowich, Arbitration: The “New Litigation,” supra note 46, at 11-16; see
also Thomas J. Stipanowich, Reflections on the State and Future of Commercial Arbitration:
Challenges, Opportunities, Proposals, 25 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 297, 341-43 (2014) (describing
the challenges associated with the increased cost of modern arbitration).
164 Stipanowich & Lamare, Living with ADR, supra note 41, at 53.
165 See Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Forum Accessibility:
Empirical Evidence, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 813 (2008) (concluding that arbitration
may be as costly or more costly than litigation for certain types of disputes and less
costly for other types).
166 See Gross, Small Claims Arbitration, supra note 1, at 66.
167 Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (2013).
161
162
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arbitration proceedings based on the size of claims, the forum in
which they take place, the subject matter of the disputes, or the
governing procedural rules.
In one case, the Court did consider evidence regarding the
relative speed of two different types of arbitration, but it did so
merely for the purpose of showing that class arbitration is slower
than bilateral arbitration. In Concepcion, the Court rejected class
arbitration as “inconsistent with the FAA” because it “makes the
process slower,” whereas speed is one of the “benefits” of
arbitration.168 To support its proposition, the Court then cited
statistics from the AAA reporting the mean time from filing to
disposition for the AAA’s “average consumer” arbitration (180
days) as compared to AAA class arbitrations (630 days).169 In fact,
the 630 days that the Court implied was too slow for AAA class
arbitration is close to the median turnaround time of many other
types of arbitration, including FINRA arbitration.170 The Court
characterized class arbitration as slow, when the process does not
appear to last much longer than many bilateral arbitrations.
Without empirical evidence demonstrating that all FAA-governed
(nonclass) arbitration is faster than litigation of the same type of
dispute, the Court’s construction of arbitrability law based on that
premise is nothing more than a house of cards.
D.

Do Parties Choose Their Arbitrators?

Fourth, the Court holds on to the now-faulty premise that
parties choose their arbitrators.171 This general statement is true
for some arbitrations in some forums, but it is not true for all
types of arbitration. Arbitrator selection occurs through several
different methods: list selection,172 tripartite,173 party agreement
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1751 (2011).
Id.
170 See Dispute Resolution Statistics, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/arbitration-andmediation/dispute-resolution-statistics [http://perma.cc/4LUY-9V6R] (showing overall
turnaround time of all arbitration cases in 2014 as 14.9 months, or roughly 449 days) (last
visited Dec. 6, 2015).
171 Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 685 (2010)
(citing the parties’ “ability to choose expert adjudicators to resolve specialized disputes”
as a benefit of arbitration).
172 In the list-selection method, the forum provides parties with a limited list
of qualified arbitrators for a particular dispute; the parties then rank listed arbitrators
in their order of preference and strike those who are objectionable. The forum
consolidates the rankings, strikes all objectionable parties, and appoints the highestranking remaining arbitrator. Parties usually have a limited number of strikes. See,
e.g., FINRA CUSTOMER CODE r. 12402(d), 12403(c) (2015).
173 In the tripartite method, each party picks one arbitrator, and those two
arbitrators then pick a third arbitrator to serve as chair of the panel. AAA COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 48, r. R-13, R-14 (2015).
168
169
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pre- or post-dispute,174 or appointment by forum,175 to name a few
more commonly used methods. The amount of “choice” parties
have varies greatly among these methods, ranging from complete
choice to none at all.176 The “choice” can be limited to ranking and
striking ten names from a randomly provided list; it can be
limited to selecting one of three arbitrators but having little say in
the other two; it can be a name selected at random by a forum and
unilaterally placed on the panel.
The amount in dispute can impact the degree of choice a
party has in selecting arbitrators. That choice can be quite limited
in small claims cases where a consumer or employee is suing a
wealthy corporation.177 For example, in AAA arbitrations
involving $500,000 or more, parties can freely select any
arbitrators they want.178 In contrast, in AAA arbitrations
involving $75,000 or less, the forum supplies five names to the
parties, and the parties select an arbitrator from this list.179 Other
arbitration forums, including FINRA,180 replicate this sliding scale
of arbitrator choice and amount. Thus, the less the claim is worth,
the less input parties tend to have. In its twenty-first-century
arbitration cases, the Court states as a fact that parties can
choose their arbitrators; this statement is simply not true for
many arbitrations.
E.

Can Parties Tailor the Arbitration Process to Suit
Their Needs?

Fifth, the Court believes parties can tailor the arbitration
process to suit their individual needs.181 In Concepcion, the Court
noted that parties are afforded “discretion in designing

174 AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, CONSTRUCTION ARBITRATION RULES, r. R-15(a)
(2015) (“If the agreement of the parties names an arbitrator or specifies a method of
appointing an arbitrator, that designation or method shall be followed.”).
175 Id. r. R-14(c) (specifying that if parties fail to select an arbitrator, the
forum can appoint one).
176 My experience as both an arbitrator and an arbitration advocate buttresses my
view that this “choice” is somewhat illusory. I have chosen and been chosen as a FINRA
arbitrator, and I know how little input the parties can have in the selection process.
177 See Gross, Small Claims Arbitration, supra note 1, at 60.
178 AAA COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 48, r. R-1(c), L-2 (2013).
179 Id. r. E-2, E-4.
180 See
Arbitrator Selection, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAnd
Mediation/Arbitration/Process/ArbitratorSelection/index.htm [http://perma.cc/6B6X-8CJB]
(last visited Dec. 6, 2015) (“The number of arbitrators appointed to a case depends on the
amount and type of relief requested in the Statement of Claim.”).
181 Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 586 (2008) (parties
can “tailor some, even many features of arbitration by contract, including the way
arbitrators are chosen”).

142

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:1

arbitration processes . . . to allow for efficient, streamlined
procedures tailored to the type of dispute.”182
In fact, a party’s lack of control is one of the main
reasons that businesses are using arbitration less.183 Many of
the FINRA arbitration rules under the Customer Code are
mandatory and not subject to parties’ modifications.184 Some
forums permit the parties to change the rules, but only when
all parties agree to the change.185 Agreement among parties in
an adversarial process is rare;186 such agreement is more likely
when there is a balance of power among the parties. Many of
the arbitrations that led to the very Supreme Court cases that
generated this characterization, however, involved parties with
vastly unequal bargaining power.187
F.

Are Arbitrators Experts in the Subject Matter of the
Dispute?

Sixth, the Court describes twenty-first-century arbitrators
as experts in the subject matter of disputes, as well as in the
arbitration forums’ procedures. In Green Tree Financial Corp. v.
Bazzle, the Court noted that arbitrators are “well situated to
answer” questions about “contract interpretation and arbitration
procedures.”188 The Court in Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc. expressed the view that NASD arbitrators are “comparatively
more expert [than judges] about the meaning of their own rule.”189
In Concepcion, the Court listed “the ability to choose expert
adjudicators to resolve specialized disputes” as one of the benefits
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1749 (2011).
Stipanowich & Lamare, Living with ADR, supra note 41, at 63 (“Why,
then, do fully half of the survey respondents think it unlikely that their company will
use arbitration in the future? . . . [I]t often comes down to perceptions of control.”).
184 FINRA, CUSTOMER CODE, supra note 47, r. 12105(a) (stating that “if the
Code provides that the parties may agree to modify a provision of the Code, or a
decision of the Director or the panel, the written agreement of all named parties is
required,” and implying that parties cannot modify all rules (emphasis added)).
185 See, e.g., AAA COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 48, r. R-1
(“The parties, by written agreement, may vary the procedures set forth in these
rules.”); JAMS, ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 49, r. 2 (“The Parties may agree on any
procedures not specified herein or in lieu of these Rules that are consistent with the
applicable law and JAMS policies . . . .”).
186 See Gross, The End of Mandatory Securities Arbitration?, supra note 1,
at 1175-76.
187 Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013) (merchant
restaurants against large consumer credit card company); CompuCredit Corp. v.
Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012) (credit card holders against credit repair organization
and credit card issuer); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1740 (2011)
(cellular phone purchasers against large, nationwide cellular service company).
188 Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 453 (2003).
189 Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 85 (2002).
182
183
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of arbitration for disputants.190 And in Pyett, it announced that
“arbitral tribunals are readily capable of handling the factual and
legal complexities of antitrust claims.”191 Moreover, “[a]n
arbitrator’s capacity to resolve complex questions of fact and law
extends with equal force to discrimination claims.”192
These statements were largely true 50 years ago, although
the extent of that truth depended even then on the type of
arbitration. Authoritative histories of arbitration in the United
States describe late nineteenth and twentieth-century arbitrators
as “drawn from the trade association’s [that offered arbitration of
trade disputes] membership” who “appl[ied] their knowledge of
the trade to bring about an equitable resolution to the dispute.”193
In fact, in this time period, the “selection of a trusted and expert
decision maker dominated the arbitration process.”194
The Court’s twenty-first-century statements on this
subject seem to rely heavily on twentieth-century FAA opinions
rather than on current empirical evidence, but without
recognizing any change in the relative expertise of arbitration
panels. The Court also relies on statements about one type of
arbitration to generalize about all arbitration. For example, the
first statement cited above from Pyett—a case about labor
arbitration—quotes verbatim from McMahon, a 1987 case
involving securities arbitration, which in turn cites to Mitsubishi,
a 1985 case about international arbitration.195 The Court in
Mitsubishi, however, cited arbitration rules of three different
international arbitration forums to support its contention that
parties can select experts to arbitrate their disputes.196 In Pyett, in
contrast, it did not cite arbitrator selection rules from the forums
that handle most labor disputes.
Today, in many forums, arbitrators are not so expert.197 I
am trained as an arbitrator for the AAA, FINRA, and the
National Futures Association. All three forums offered abundant
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1751.
14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 268 (2009) (quoting
Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 232 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 634 (1985)).
192 14 Penn Plaza, 556 U.S. at 269.
193 Stone, Rustic Justice, supra note 26, at 972. Most of these histories, however,
focus on specific subject matter rather than on general, domestic commercial arbitration.
194 Brunet, supra note 26, at 43.
195 14 Penn Plaza, 556 U.S. at 268 (quoting McMahon, 482 U.S. at 232).
196 Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 633, n.17.
197 See Sarah Rudolph Cole, Managerial Litigants? The Overlooked Problem of
Party Autonomy in Dispute Resolution, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1199, 1242 (2000) (“Today,
arbitrators often are not considered experts in the subject matter of the dispute they
arbitrate because many disputes involve statutory and legal claims rather than claims
that can be resolved by examining industry customs.”).
190
191
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training on process but no training on any substantive law.198 And
only if the parties have sophisticated counsel and spend money on
pre- and post-hearing briefs do the parties educate the arbitrators
about applicable law and procedure. Furthermore, for some
arbitrations, the more expert arbitrators are, the less likely they
will be conflict-free, as their expertise necessarily entails
professional connections and relationships in the very industry
that is the subject of the dispute.199 “Expert” arbitrators are more
likely to know the parties and/or their counsel, thus conflicting
themselves out of serving as a neutral on a panel.200
The Court is also inconsistent on the notion that
arbitrators are experts. While most Supreme Court opinions in
this area tout arbitrators as subject matter experts capable of
interpreting complex statutory schemes, according to the Court,
arbitrators are not experts in class action procedures: “[A]rbitrators
are not generally knowledgeable in the often-dominant procedural
aspects of [class] certification . . . .”201 The Court continued, “And it
is at the very least odd to think that an arbitrator would be
entrusted with ensuring that third parties’ due process rights are
satisfied.”202 Without any basis for the distinction, the Court
minimized arbitrators’ expertise on class action procedures while
simultaneously proclaiming arbitrators as experts on statutory
discrimination claims.
The Court’s premise that arbitrators are subject matter
experts is simply no longer true. As for process expertise, it
very much depends on the type of arbitration.

198 To be fair, to be eligible as an arbitrator for specific subject matter rosters at
the AAA, an arbitrator must have significant experience in that particular subject matter.
See, e.g., Qualification Criteria for Admittance to the AAA Labor Panel, AM. ARB. ASS’N,
https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTG_003879
[http://perma.cc/TBL4-FFU2]
(last visited Dec. 6, 2015).
199 See Morelite Constr. Corp. v. N.Y.C. Dist. Council Carpenters Benefit Funds,
748 F.2d 79, 83 (2d Cir. 1984) (acknowledging that “to disqualify any arbitrator who had
professional dealings with one of the parties [to say nothing of a social acquaintanceship]
would make it impossible, in some circumstances, to find a qualified arbitrator at all”); cf.
Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1968) (recognizing
that “arbitrators cannot sever all their ties with the business world, since they are not
expected to get all their income from their work deciding cases”).
200 See Lindsay Melworm, Note, Biased? Prove It: Addressing Arbitrator Bias and
the Merits of Implementing Broad Disclosure Standards, 22 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L.
431, 464 (2014) (explaining that “too much knowledge or exposure in any particular area
can lend itself to generating conflicts of interest or may necessarily involve prior
relationships that compromise the independence and impartiality of the arbitrator”).
201 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750 (2011).
202 Id. at 1751-52.
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Is There Meaningful Review of Arbitration Awards?

Finally, the Court believes lower courts engage in limited
though meaningful review of arbitration awards: FAA sections 9–
11 “substantiat[e] a national policy favoring arbitration with just
the limited review needed to maintain arbitration’s essential
virtue of resolving disputes straightaway” (as compared to a
“time-consuming judicial review process”).203 But the Court itself
recently acknowledged that the grounds for review are very
limited.204 There are no grounds for review of any errors of law,205
and parties who want it cannot even add it to their arbitration
agreements.206 Indeed, in Concepcion, the Court noted that the
lack of appellate review of arbitration was a reason a company
could not possibly have wanted class arbitration—a “bet the
company” type proceeding in which the stakes are very high.207
Ironically, when it benefits corporations to do so, the Court
acknowledges reality and concedes that the available means of
review are insufficient.
CONCLUSION
As demonstrated in Part III, the Court’s view of
arbitration in its opinions since the 1980s is not based on reality.
Rather, it rests on an outdated description of the arbitration
process, recognizes no developments in the process since the early
twentieth century, and fails to distinguish among the various
types of arbitration. The discrepancy between the Court’s
description of arbitration and the actual process is greatest for
arbitrations of small claims involving consumers, individual
investors, lower-level employees, and franchisees. Many

Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 588 (2008).
See Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2068 (2013) (“Under
the FAA, courts may vacate an arbitrator’s decision ‘only in very unusual circumstances.’”
(quoting First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995)).
205 After Hall Street, the Courts of Appeals are divided on whether “manifest
disregard of the law” remains a viable ground to challenge an award. See Jill Gross,
Arbitration Case Law Update 2014, in SECURITIES ARBITRATION 2014, at 300-01
(Practising Law Institute) (discussing current status of circuit split); see also Jill Gross,
Hall Street Blues: The Uncertain Future of Manifest Disregard, 37 SEC. REG. L. J. 232
(2009) (predicting the post-Hall Street future of the manifest-disregard standard). Even
for those courts that recognize the standard, it is difficult for parties to meet. See, e.g.,
Abu Dhabi Inv. Auth. v. Citigroup, Inc., 557 F. App’x 66, 67 (2d Cir. 2014) (restating the
oft-cited principle that “[a]wards are vacated for manifest disregard only in ‘those
exceedingly rare instances where some egregious impropriety on the part of the
arbitrator[ ] is apparent’” (citation omitted)).
206 Hall Street, 556 U.S. at 585-86.
207 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1752.
203
204
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arbitration participants are bound by a legal framework that has
no bearing on the process it purports to regulate.
Let us imagine what might have happened if the Court
had considered the reality of twenty-first-century arbitration. It
might have concluded that parties are not always able to choose
their arbitrators, that many arbitrators are not experts in the
subject matter of the dispute, that some arbitration proceedings
are as (or more) costly and time consuming as court cases, and
that some disputants do not have the ability to design the process
to suit their needs. Under these conditions, Justice Scalia might
have had more difficulty justifying the Court’s holdings that all
federal statutory claims are arbitrable absent a contrary
congressional command, that claimants can vindicate their
statutory rights even in the face of a class action waiver, and that
the FAA preempts state laws that invalidate class action waivers.
In contrast, the actual holdings of the Hat Trick cases, evolved
from twentieth-century arbitration jurisprudence, shut off any
safety valve remaining for parties subject to unfair and adhesive
arbitration agreements.
By ignoring the actual varied and complex twenty-firstcentury practice of arbitration, the Court is able to not only
promote arbitration, but also unclog court congestion,208 appease
corporate interests by enforcing their arbitration clauses,209 and
suppress claims of individual consumers and employees.210 The
Court’s arbitration jurisprudence ensures the enforceability of
most PDAAs with class action waivers and other provisions—
provisions that make it very difficult for parties with unequal
bargaining power to enforce their rights, rendering those rights
illusory. The Court in its legal doctrine thus ignores the economic
realities of dispute resolution.211
The disconnect between the Court’s understanding of
arbitration and the reality of the current process has sparked a
shift away from arbitration as a preferred method of dispute
208 See Nancy A. Welsh, Mandatory Predispute Consumer Arbitration,
Structural Bias, and Incentivizing Procedural Safeguards, 42 SW. L. REV. 187, 188
(2012) (arguing that “the Supreme Court’s enthusiastic embrace of mandatory
predispute arbitration should be understood primarily as institutional self-help, as an
opportunistic search for the funding and personnel that courts need to conduct factfinding and decision-making in cases that the courts perceive as routine”).
209 Cf. Barbara Black, Arbitration of Investors’ Claims Against Issuers: An Idea
Whose Time Has Come?, 75 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 115 (2012) (describing the current
Court as “pro-business”).
210 See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
211 Cf. Welsh, supra note 208, at 228 (“If the Supreme Court is indeed
incentivizing the creation of a national, private small claims court, it also must assume
responsibility for assuring the sufficiency of the justice—procedural and substantive—
provided by such a court.”).
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resolution.212 Many parties prefer litigation or mediation to
arbitration in nonadhesive situations.213 Recent studies show
that in-house counsel are shifting away from arbitration.214 The
AAA now mandates mediation before arbitration, suggesting
that the premier arbitration forum in the world no longer views
arbitration as a first choice alternative to litigation.215
The Court’s mistakes about arbitration, particularly those
used to justify the outcomes in the Hat Trick cases, have
correlated with a decline in arbitration as a method of alternative
dispute resolution. The correlation is suggestive. Increased
enforcement of arbitration clauses led to the rise of arbitration.
With an increase in mandatory arbitration came harsher criticism
of the fairness of the process. Forums tried to meet fairness
concerns by adopting legalistic processes. As arbitration became
more litigation-like, disputants with a choice moved away from
arbitration; those without a choice were forced into a process not
tailored to their disputes.216 The Court then rejected challenges to
forced arbitration on the grounds that arbitration has protective
and other features that it actually no longer possesses.
In the end, the declining use of arbitration hurts process
pluralism. Scholars explain the strength of the ADR movement as
stemming from the value disputants place on the availability of a
range of dispute resolution mechanisms. Disputants can select
the most appropriate mechanism for a particular dispute and be
confident that the mechanism will deliver procedural and

212 Stipanowich, Arbitration: The “New Litigation,” supra note 46, at 5 (“[I]t
appears that discontent with commercial arbitration has never been more palpable if
not more widespread.”).
213 Theodore Eisenberg et al., Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers: An Empirical
Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 871(2008) (reporting on results of study of arbitration clauses in consumer and
nonconsumer contexts within the same company and concluding that “absence of
arbitration provisions in the vast majority of material [nonconsumer] contracts suggests
that, ex ante, many firms value, even prefer, litigation over arbitration to resolve disputes
with peers”); Robert A. Baruch Bush, Substituting Mediation for Arbitration: The
Growing Market for Evaluative Mediation, and What It Means for the ADR Field, 3 PEPP.
DISP. RESOL. L.J. 111, 122 (2002) (describing parties’ flight from arbitration towards
evaluative mediation).
214 Stipanowich & Lamare, Living with ADR, supra note 41, at 45.
215 See AAA COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 48, r. R-9 (2013) (“In all
cases where a claim or counterclaim exceeds $75,000, upon the AAA’s administration of the
arbitration or at any time while the arbitration is pending, the parties shall mediate their
dispute pursuant to the applicable provisions of the AAA’s Commercial Mediation
Procedures, or as otherwise agreed by the parties.”).
216 Eisenberg et al., Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers, supra note 213, at 888-89
(positing that empirical evidence suggests that companies do not prefer arbitration in
business-to-business disputes, but prefer it in consumer disputes in which an adhesive
arbitration clause can preclude aggregate dispute resolution).
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substantive justice.217 In a process-pluralistic world, disputants
can also tailor and customize a particular mechanism to an
individualized dispute.218 Yet studies show increased dissatisfaction
with arbitration and the loss of arbitration’s core value—choice.219
If disputants lose faith in a mechanism as promoting justice,
fewer options remain.
Arbitration plays a useful role in the ADR spectrum, and
eliminating it as an option reduces the appeal of ADR.220
Paradoxically, the Court’s most recent FAA cases remove
arbitration as a dispute resolution tool in the toolbox for those
with a choice and mandate it as a tool for those without a choice.
Given the need for ADR mechanisms in our legal system today,
reducing the appeal of arbitration is bad for justice.

217 In their seminal piece, Professors Sander and Goldberg set up a framework for
lawyers to evaluate and advise clients on which ADR process is best suited for a particular
dispute. See Frank E.A. Sander and Stephen B. Goldberg, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss: A
User-Friendly Guide to Selecting an ADR Procedure, 10 NEG. J. 49 (1994).
218 Lande, Getting the Faith, supra note 5, at 148-49 (“The essence of this ideology
is that many different features of disputing processes can be manipulated and customized
for each dispute.”).
219 Stipanowich, Arbitration: The “New Litigation,” supra note 46, at 51-52
(concluding that parties generally do not but should design arbitration clauses more
deliberately to specify characteristics of the process that would best suit the type of dispute
being arbitrated, in order to “fulfill the promise” of arbitration’s virtues).
220 Cole, On Babies and Bathwater, supra note 89, at 506 (“Arbitration fairness
should not mean the elimination of arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism.”);
Stipanowich, Arbitration: The “New Litigation,” supra note 46, at 8 (arguing that, to
maximize the benefits of arbitration, disputants must “embrac[e] a more nuanced view of
arbitration processes and . . . mak[e] or promot[e] more appropriate process choices”).

